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The 50th Anniversary of the Nuremberg Doctor's trial is an occasion for
reflecting on the true meaning of the verdicts in the trial and for deciding whether
the outcome has had a lasting impact on medical ethics and human rights. One of
the dangers in considering the historical significance of these trials is that we will
consider the actions of the Nazi doctors to have been an isolated aberration,
deri vati ve of the excesses of the Thrid Reich. If we are secure in our opinion that
such medical atrocities are impossible in well-ordered societies, governed by the
rule of law, we will have missed an important lesson.
What happened in the Nazi euthanasia and sterilization programs was not
against the law in Germany.The Nuremberg tribunal was an international Court
convened by the victorious nations after the war. Had there been another
outcome, the Germans as a victorious nation would surely not have accused
themselves of crimes against humanity. When the Allied armies liberated the
Nazi death camps, the processes of justice and accountability were placed in
motion to their inevitable outcome in Nuremberg. When genocide was
commited by the Turks against the Armenians, by the Russians against the
Ukrainian Kulaks, or by the Nigerians against the Ibos, the only trials were
belated complaints in the courts of public opinion. It becomes increasingly
obvious that the perpetrators of Serbian ethnic cleansing will suffer only the
wrist-slaps allowed by political expediency.
The sterilization programs and the euthanasia programs were separate from
the Holocaust. When the German sterilization programs were publicized before
World War II, they were praised, not condemned by Social Darwinists in the
United States.l The origin of the euthanasia movement was the official approval
given by Dr. Karl Brandt, Hitler's personal emissary, for the killing of the
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multiply handicapped Baby Knauer. The lesson of Baby Knauer was obviously
lost on the attending physicians of Baby Doe in Indiana. 2 When Dr. Andrew Ivy,
as an expert witness for the prosecution at the Nuremberg trials solicited the
AMA for its position paper on protection of human subjects, he was dismayed to
find that there was no such document and that it would be necessary to improvise
a post-facto statement for use in the trials. 3 Now we have the Nuremberg code
and the more explicit Declaration of Helsinki, but we continue to have exposes of
activities which contravene the principles of one or both sets of rules. The
Willowbrook experiments,4 the Tuskegee experiment,S the sterilization of the
Reif sisters in Alabama,6 the decapitation of liveborn infants by American
researchers in Finland7 and a long list of questionable military personnel
experiments8 have been exposed.
In most of these experiments there has been a preliminary process of what
Ericson has called "pseudospeciation" in which other human beings have been
redefined as belonging to another species. The "Untermenschen" of the Dachau
experiments are joined by the retarded children of Willowbrook, the syphilitic
black men at Tuskegee, the allegedly promiscuous welfare recipients in Alabama,
aborted children in Finland and the disadvantaged military enlisted: all to be
defined out of existence as protected experimental subjects. Although the
euthanasia programs and the genocidal holocaust were separate, they were not
unrelated. Direct medical killing is a prefiguring or rehearsal for killing on a larger
scale. The reciprocal seems also to be true. Life cheapened by the mass killings of the
death camps was easily nominated for the research of Dr. Mengele because the
research subject would "die anyway". Millions of abortions have the cumulative
effect of conditioning the scientific community to justify highly questionable fetal
experimentation.
Two fundamental philosophic positions come in to play when the issues of
protection of human subjects, including prebom children, are debated. One position
would assert a transcendental view of human life at all stages of life's continuum
-embryonic, fetal, child, adult. Life at all stages, in this view has an intrinsic and
unquantifiable value. This value transcends the real or alleged values of
experimentation and research. If a human is deformed, dying of a fatal disease, or
pre-viable, the ontological goodness of his being is still intact.
The other position would consign to human beings values that are extrinsic. Each
human life is not an end in and of itself but rather a means to another end which is
the good ofthe society. Extrinsic value is not a per se condition of life and some are
said to lack it.9 From the totalitarian view that the individual exists for the society
one can conclude that experiments can be performed on a member of this
generation in order to benefit the members of future generations. An experiment
performed on a pregnant woman scheduled for abortion may help a "wanted" child
to have a better chance of survival. Lives which grossly lack "quality" (e.g. trisomy
21) should be terminated early for their own and Society'S good.
Fetal experimentation has become the paradigm for the conflicted protection of
human subjects for experimentation. How can the conflicts raised by the
philosophies of intrinsic vs. extrinsic value of human life be reconciled in this most
sensitive arena? One essential first step is to treat the pre-viable child
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delivered by abortion the same as any other subject for human experimentation.
The original Presidential Commission on fetal experimentation declined to do
this. It recommended different rules for non-therapeutic, greater-than-minimal
risk experimentation on fetuses to be aborted in contrast to fetuses to go to term. 10
It overruled a minority report by Louisell which said "no research should be
permitted on a fetus to be aborted that could not be permitted on one to go to
term". It even invented different names for the two classes. It called the subject for
experimentation a "possibly viable human infant" if it was not aborted and a
"possibly viable fetus ex-utero" if it had been aborted. Since "fetus" is a term to
describe a stage of intrauterine life, "fetus ex-utero" is a contradiction in terms.
One may reasonably suspect that this oxymoron was invented out of reluctance
to humanize the product of an abortion.
Likewise the issue of consent is very tenuous in the area of fetal
experimentation. If the decision for abortion is accepted as a resolution of a
conflict concerning the rights of the child, then it must be admitted that the
mother who chooses abortion has demonstrated her willingness to prefer her
rights to those of the child. Parents who give proxy consent to experimentation on
their children are usually accepted as having affectional bonds to their children.
Such bonds would be highly dubious in the mother who gives consent for
experiments on her live aborted offspring. I I
Non-therapeutic fetal experimentation violates the consent principle of the
Nuremberg code 12 as well as its principles regarding the protection of the
experimental subject from harm and death (principles 4,5,6,10). Article 111-1 of
the Declaration of Helsinki states "In the purely scientific application of clinical
research carried out on a human being, it is the duty of the doctor to remain the
protector of the life and health of that person on whom research is being carried
out." Non-therapeutic fetal experimentation violates this principle clearly. The
most dramatic violation would be those experiments in which human life is
begun by in-vitro fertilization in anticipation of its being experimented on and
then killed. Articles 1-3, and 111-3b, and 111-4b of the Helsinki Code are also
germane to the types of fetal and newborn experiments which have brought
criticism.
The various scientific panels convened by HHS for the purpose of establishing
rules for fetal experimentation have averted their gaze from the standards of the
Nuremberg and Helsinki Codes. This is based on the questionable notion that
abortion has displaced all preborn abortion candidates and all newborn previable aborted infants outside the realm of legal protection as experimental
sUbjects. While such standards are observed and defended within the scientific
community, we must presume that the lessons of the Nuremberg Doctors' trials
remain unlearned and unheeded.
REFERENCES
1. Eugenic Sterilization lAMA 101:294, 1933 Foreign Letters
2. Robertson, J. Involuntary Euthanasia of Defective Newborns Stanford Law Review
27:213, 1973
3. Supplementary Report of the Judicial Council lAMA 132:1090, 1946

May, 1997

19

4. Krugman, S. Experiments at Willowbrook State School Lancet 2:749, 1971
5. Jones, J. Bad Blood Free Press 1981, New York, N.Y.
6. Douglas, W.O. The Right To Have Offspring Child and Family 10:69, 1971
7. Adam, P.A. et al Cerebral Oxidation of Glucose in the Isolated Human Head Trans. Am
Pediatric Soc. 309:81 , 1973
8. Report of Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments JAMA 276:403, 1996
9. Fletcher, J. Indicators of Humanhood, Hastings Center Report 2:1, 1974
10. Protection of Human Subjects, Proposed Policy Federal Register 40:33525, 1975
11 . Hearings of the Health Subcommittee Senate Public Welfare Committee Congressional
RecordS:11776, 1974
12. The Nuremberg Code 276:1691, 1996

••

I

~

20

Linacre Quarterly

